A novel decision method for autoepistemic reasoning is developed and proved correct. The method is applicable in a general setting, i.e., for an autoepistemic logic based on a given classical logic. It provides a decision procedure for a tightly grounded form of autoepistemic reasoning based on L-hierarchic expansions as well as for autoepistemic reasoning based on Moorestyle expansions and N-expansions. Prominent formalizations of nonmonotonic reasoning, such as default logic and circumscription, can be embedded into autoepistemic logic based on L-hierarchic expansions using simple local translations. Hence, the method can serve as a unified reasoning tool for a wide range of forms of nonmonotonic reasoning. The method is conceptually simple, and the inherent sources of complexity and targets for optimization are clearly identifiable. As an example of exploiting optimization possibilities, a new decision method for Reiter's default logic is developed where ideas from autoepistemic reasoning are used to prune the search space for applicable default rules when constructing extensions of a default theory.
Introduction
We study the problem of automating nonmonotonic reasoning. Several forms of nonmonotonic reasoning have been proposed, and in recent years research has been focused on relationships between different formalizations. Despite different starting points and underlying intuitions, leading approaches to nonmonotonic reasoning have turned out to be closely related. Our aim is to exploit the close connections so that a single theorem-proving method could be used as a unified approach to automating a wide range of forms of nonmonotonic reasoning. An interesting idea is to choose some formalization of nonmonotonic reasoning as a basic system and develop a decision method for it. Decision procedures for other forms of nonmonotonic reasoning can then be realized by reducing decision problems in a given formalization to decision problems in the basic system. In this paper we consider the possibility of using a variant of autoepistemic logic as the basic system, and we develop a novel decision method for autoepistemic reason-* This is an expanded version of a paper that appeared in the Proceedings of the Fourth International Conference on Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning (Bonn, May, 1994), pp. 473-484. ing that can serve as a basis for a unified approach to automating nonmonotonic reasoning.
Autoepistemic logic was originally introduced by Moore [32] . Recent results show that autoepistemic logic covers a range of prominent forms of nonmonotonic reasoning [22, 29, 23, 28, 9, 1 I, 13, 20] . However, some of the embeddings are rather complicated because the original autoepistemic logic allows weakly grounded conclusions, which have to be eliminated in the embeddings using extra conditions [22, 29] or complicated translations [15] . In this paper we adopt a tightly grounded form of autoepistemic logic based on L-hierarchic expansions [37] as the basic system. In L-hierarchic expansions the troublesome weakly grounded conclusions are excluded but without introducing dependence on the syntactic representation of the premises, This kind of dependence is typical of other similar tightly grounded classes of expansions [22, 29] . Furthermore, simple local translations can be used to reduce decision problems in other forms of nonmonotonic reasoning to decision problems in autoepistemic logic based on L-hierarchic expansions [39] .
Besides autoepistemic logic, there are many other interesting alternatives to be used as the basic system including logic programming, default logic [43] , McDermott and Doyle-style nonmonotonic modal logics [28] , and systems based on two modalities [26, 25] . Autoepistemic logic provides a rather expressive basic language. This implies that other general approaches to nonmonotonic reasoning such as default logic can be captured using simple local translations. When using a basic language with limited expressivity such as that of logic programs, more complicated translations are needed. Autoepistemic logic has a uniform syntax unlike default logic. This enables a unified treatment of default rules, queries, and integrity constraints. The original autoepistemic logic has been shown to belong to the family of McDermott mad Doyle-style nonmonotonic modal logics [46] . But as opposed to other approaches to formalizing nonmonotonic reasoning based on modal logic, the original autoepistemic logic as well as the variant based on L-hierarchic expansions is rather uncomplicated. They are direct extensions of the underlying classical logic where only straightforward principles of positive and negative introspection are added but no modal axioms are needed. From the implementational point of view this is fortunate because well-developed classical theorem proving techniques can be employed instead of resorting to modal theorem proving methods.
Several decision methods have been proposed for the original autoepistemic logic. Some of these [33, 47, 46, 28] are straightforward applications of a particular finita D, characterization of autoepistemic reasoning, some [34] use extensively a specific underlying proof method and some [30, 18, 31] are based on the idea of mapping a decision problem in autoepistemic logic into another problem. In this work we develop a decision method for autoepistemic logic in a general setring, i.e., for an autoepistemic logic based on a given classical logic. The method handles, with minor adjustments, autoepistemic reasoning based on L-hierarchic expansions as well as original Moore-style autoepistemic reasoning. At this stage we do not wish to commit to a particular underlying proof method, and we aim at a conceptually clear method where the sources of complexity and targets for optimization are clearly identifiable. Furthermore, we try to avoid exponential worst-case space requirements which seem to be inherent in the more advanced methods [34, 30, 18, 31] . This aspect is discussed in detail in Section 4.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces autoepistemic logic and presents a finitary characterization of expansions, which forms the basis for the computational treatment of autoepistemic reasoning. Section 3 discusses translations from other forms of nonmonotonic reasoning to autoepistemic logic, which suggest that autoepistemic logic based on L-hierarchic expansions can be viewed as an interesting unified approach to a large range of forms of nonmonotonic reasoning. In Section 4 we first develop a novel decision method for autoepistemic logic based on L-hierarchic expansions and prove the correctness of the method. Then we show how to modify the method in order to obtain decision methods for the original autoepistemic logic and for nonmonotonic modal logic N. The novel method offers an interesting framework for developing further optimization techniques, and as an example of this we derive a new decision method for Reiter's default logic.
Autoepistemic Logic
Autoepistemic logic is a modal logic with an operator L, which is interpreted as "is believed." Autoepistemic logic models the beliefs of an ideally rational fully introspective agent. The main object of interest in autoepistemic logic is the set of beliefs of the agent given a set of sentences as the initial premises of the agent. The agent's ideal rationality implies that the agent believes exactly every logical consequence of the initial assumptions and her/his beliefs. Full introspection entails that the agent is capable of using both positive introspection (if X is a belief, so is Lx) and negative introspection (if X is not a belief, then -~L)~ is). The following example illustrates the concept of autoepistemic reasoning. The intuitive reading of this sentence is that if the agent does not believe p, then --,p holds (a kind of a closed world assumption). Given the sentence above as the initial assumption of the agent, what is the set of beliefs of the agent? Does, for example, -W belong to the set of beliefs? In fact, ~p is one of the beliefs of the agent. This can be shown informally as follows. The sentence p is not one of the beliefs of the agent because it is not a logical consequence of the initial assumption and the set of beliefs. Thus, by negative introspection ~Lp is one of the beliefs of the agent, and -~p is a logical consequence of this belief and the initial assumption.
If p is added to the premises, ~p no longer belongs to the set of beliefs of the agent. So autoepistemic reasoning is nonmonotonic in the sense that the set of beliefs does not grow monotonically when the set of premises is extended.
• We consider a general setting where a classical logic CL is given and an autoepistemic logic CLae is built on top of that. This kind of a general setting has already been studied [38] . Let/2 be the language of CL. We extend/2 by adding a monadic operator L not appearing in/2 and obtain an autoepistemic language /2ae, which is the language of CLac. The language /2ae is defined recursively as /2 but with an extra formation rule:
if ¢ E/~ae is a sentence, then L¢ E /2ae.
Thus we consider autoepistemic logics where quantification into a modal context is not allowed even if/2 contains quantifiers (e.g., formulae of the form VxLP (x) are not allowed). To simplify the treatment, we consider only closed formulae. So from here on we let/2 and/2ae contain only closed formulae.
In the general setting the role of the underlying logic CL is to induce a logical consequence relation ~ae which determines the strength of the rationality of the agent: an ideally rational agent believes the logical consequences given by ~ae. This consequence relation is a simple extension of the consequence relation ~cl of CL, where the L¢ formulae are treated like atomic formulae in the propositional calculus. It can be formalized straightforwardly in the following way using a decoupling approach that has been employed by Konolige [22] in the case of autoepistemic logic based on a first-order logic (see also [38] ). We assume that the semantics of the underlying logic CL is defined in the usual way. A set of CL-structures $ is given. Then a relation ~cl between the structures and sentences in/2 is defined. I ~cl ¢ means that a sentence ¢ is true in a structure I. For a set of sentences E, [ ~cl E holds iff I ~cl ¢ holds for every ¢ E E. We also assume that CL contains the classical negation (-,): ~¢ is true iff ¢ is not true. This is because in autoepistemic logic CLae we must be able to talk about not believing.
The decoupling approach is used to extend this semantics to the richer language of CLae by dividing the structures in which the sentences of /2ae are interpreted into two parts. One part is a regular CL-structure which is used to interpret the operators of CL. The other is a set of sentences containing the beliefs of the agent. Thus the set of AE-structures is the set of pairs (I, T) where I E S and T c_ /2ae. The relation ~ae between AE-structures and sentences in /2ae is defined inductively on the formation of ¢ as ~cl in the case of CL with the addition of the valuation rule for the new L¢ sentences:
(I, T) ~ae L¢ iff ¢ E T.
(I, T) ~ae ¢ means that a sentence ¢ is true in an AE-structure (I, T). So Lq~ is true in (I, T) iff ¢ is one of the beliefs of the agent given by the set T.
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The decoupling approach induces a logical consequence relation ~e which is very similar to the logical consequence relation ~cl of the underlying logic.
DEFINITION 2.2 ([38]
). For a set of sentences N and a sentence 95, ~ ~ae 95 holds iff for all CL-structures I and for all sets of sentences T C_/2ae, {I, T) ~ae implies (I, T) ~ae 95-This consequence relation is monotonic, treats L95 formulae like atomic formulae in the propositional calculus, and behaves otherwise like the consequence relation of the underlying logic. EXAMPLE 2.3. Let the underlying logic CL be some propositional modal logic of knowledge. For example, let CL be $4 (although the choice of a particular logic plays no role in the development). Hence the language of CL is that of the propositional logic extended with a monadic operator K, and the semantics is given using Kripke structures [4, 16] . For a modal logic with one modality, the Kripke structures can be take as tuples (W, R, P, w), where W is a set of worlds, R is a binary relation on W, P is a function assigning a truth-value to every atomic proposition for each world in W, and w is a world. We aim to build an autoepistemic logic CLae on top of CL. First, the language of CL is extended by a new monadic operator L. Hence, e.g., formulae of the form K-~LKO ~ ~b belong to the language/;ae of CLae. Second, we need to define the logical consequence relation ~ae. In order to achieve this we have to specify when a formula 95 in/;ae is true in an AE-structure (I, T) where I is a Kripke structure and T C_ /~ae. This is done exactly as in CL when defining when a formula is true in a world w ((W, R, P, w) ~cl 95) but with adding the new valuation rule for L95 formulae.
Let I = (W, R, P, w) and T C_ £ae. 1. (/-, T) ~ae 95 iff (I/V~/~, P, w) ~cl 95 (i.e., iff 95 is true in the world w) when 95 is atomic. [] To capture a tight notion of autoepistemic reasoning, Niemel~i [37] has proposed an enumeration-based method where autoepistemic reasoning is formalized as a sequence of introspection steps of an ideally rational agent. The idea is to build a set of beliefs from premises N by applying introspection to sentences in the order given by an enumeration c. A set Be(N) is constructed that contains the results of introspection. The set Be(N) together with N induces the set of beliefs SEe(N) of an agent having initial assumptions N after introspecting sentences in the order e.
DEFINITION 2.4 ([37])
. Let E __ /~ae. Let e = ~31, ~3z,... be an enumeration of sentences in/Eae. Let B~(E) = 0 and define B~+ 1 (E) for i = 0, 1,... as follows:
Finally let OO
B~(E) = UB~(E)
i=0 SE (E) = {¢ e Lae I X U B (E) Pae ¢}.
In order to guarantee that the introspection principles of autoepistemic reasoning are respected, the enumeration e is required to be acceptable with respect to the set of premises.
DEFINITION 2.5 ([37]
). An enumeration e is E-acceptable if there is no i and no formula ¢ such that --,L¢E B~(E) but E U B~(E) ~ae ¢. EXAMPLE 2.6. Consider the propositional case, a set of premises E = {--,Lp q} and an enumeration e = q,p,... Then B~(E) = {-~Lq} as E ~=ae q and B (E) = { Lq, Lp} as EUB (E) g=a P. This enumeration is not E-acceptable because --,Lq E B~(E) but E U B~(E) ~ae q.
• We assume that the underlying consequence relation ~ae is compact, i.e., if E ~ae qb, there exists a finite subset E' of E such that E ! ~ae ¢-For compact logics the acceptability condition implies that the introspection principles are not violated and the resulting set of beliefs is a Moore-style expansion [32] . THEOREM 2.7 ( [37, 38] Enumeration-based expansions, i.e., sets of beliefs induced by acceptable enumerations, are a proper subclass of Moore-style expansions. In the propositional case they coincide with N-expansions [28] which are the same as iterative expansions [29] (see [37] ). Weakly grounded beliefs in N-expansions can be eliminated by requiring enumerations to be L-hierarchic. This means that a sentence ¢ can appear in an introspection sequence only after all ~ such that L~b is a subformula of ¢ have appeared in the sequence. The resulting L-hierarchic expansions provide an interesting tightly grounded form of autoepistemic reasoning.
DEFINITION 2.8 ([37]). Let e be an enumeration ~b~, ~2, • -• of sentences in £ae-
The enumeration e is L-hierarchic iff for all ~bi, ~b a in e holds that if L~i is a subformula of ~bj, then i < j.
A set of sentences A is an L-hierarchic expansion of E iff A = SEe(E) for some E-acceptable L-hierarchic enumeration ~ of/2ae. L-hierarchic expansions provide an interesting tightly grounded subclass of Moorestyle expansions. In the propositional case L-hierarchic expansions are always minimal with respect to their L free parts, whereas N-expansions and other McDermott and Doyle-style expansions can be nonminimal [37] . Furthermore, L-hierarchic expansions are not dependent on the syntactic representation of the premises in the sense that classically equivalent sets of premises have exactly the same set of expansions. Two sets E and E' are classically equivalent iff for every AE-structure (I,T), {I,T) ~ae E iff (I,T) ~ae y]'' For example, if the underlying logic is the classical propositional logic, then two sets are classically equivalent if they are propositionally equivalent when the Lq5 formulae are treated like atomic formulae in the propositional logic. This independence of the syntactic representation does not hold for other more strongly grounded classes of expansions introduced by Konolige [22] and Marek and Tmszczyfiski [29] , which satisfy the minimality requirement. EXAMPLE 2.9. Consider the propositional case, a set of premises E = {~L~Lp -+ p}, (1) where p is an atomic formula and an enumeration c = -~Lp, p,... Now ~ leads to a nonminimal enumeration-based expansion (N-expansion) containing a weakly grounded belief p (see also [37] ). However, E is not L-hierarchic.
I! An expansion of premises is a possible set of conclusions derivable from the premises. But because there are premises with multiple expansions, the concepts of cautious and brave reasoning are introduced. Given a class of expansions, a formula is derivable from a set of premises in the cautious sense iff it is in every expansion of the premises and in the brave sense iff it is at least in one of the expansions. We denote the derivability relations with respect to L-hierarchic, enumeration-based and Moore-style expansions by ~c(LE), ~"~b(LE), be(E), ~'°b(E), ~c, ~b, respectively. For L-hierarchic expansions the derivability relations are defined as follows. (Other derivability relations are defined similarly.) DEFINITION 2.10. Y]~c(LE) q~ iff q5 C A for every L-hierarchic expansion A of E. E~b(LE) ~b iff there is an L-hierarchic expansion ~ of E such that q5 E ~.
Expansions are infinite sets of sentences, and a finitary characterization is needed to enable a computational treatment of autoepistemic reasoning. We use ILKKA NIEMEL) i, a characterization based on full sets [35, 36, 38] . Full sets were first introduced for Moore-style stable expansions [35] and later extended to handle enumerationbased expansions (N-expansions) and L-hierarchic expansions [38] . The notion of full sets provides a simple and compact representation of expansions, which is straightforwardly applicable in the general setting considered here.
Similar finitary characterizations for Moore-style stable expansions have been developed independently by other researchers. An overview can be found in [38] . Closest to full sets is the approach of Schwarz, who studies McDermott and Doyle-style nonmonotonic modal logics and develops finitary characterizations for expansions in several nonmonotonic modal logics including those corresponding to original autoepistemic logic [46] . Schwarz extends this approach together with Marek and Truszczyfiski; and based on the finitary characterization of expansions, they proposed a decision method for several nonmonotonic modal logics [28] , which is quite similar to that proposed for autoepistemic logic [35, 361. We introduce some notation. For an LX formula, q-atom(Lx) = q-atom(-,Lx) = LX and for a set A, q-atom(A) = {q-atom(C) [ ¢ E A}. The set of all subformulae of the form L X of a formula ¢ is denoted by sfL(¢), and sfqL(¢) is the set of all subformulae of the form LX of ¢ which are not in the scope of another L operator in ¢. For a set of formulae E, sfL(E) = U¢cs sfL(¢) and similarly for sfqL(E). EXAMPLE 2.11. Let the underlying logic be the classical propositional calculus and let E = {Lp, q A L~L(Lp A -~q)}. Then
We define a simple consequence relation ~L, which is given recursively on top of the underlying consequence relation ~ae-The idea here is to incorporate the introspection principles of autoepistemic reasoning into the consequence relation so that L¢ sentences are no longer treated like atomic sentences. DEFINITION 2.12 ([36] ). Given a set of sentences E and a sentence ¢, the relation E ~L @ is defined by recursion on the complexity of ¢ as follows:
The following example shows that ~L is a nonmonotonic consequence relation. EXAMPLE 2.1 3. Let the underlying logic be the classical propositional calculus, and let p be an atomic sentence. Then (a ~L -@P holds. This can be verified as follows. First note that for a formula 05 with no L05 subformulae, SBe(05) = {3 and E ~L 05 iff E ~ae ¢. As sfqL(p) : (~, (~ ~=L P holds because 0 ~::ae P holds. This implies that SB0(~Lp) = {-~Lp}. Thus (~ ~L -~Lp holds.
On the other hand, {p} ~L P holds because {p} ~ae P holds. This implies that SB{p}(~Lp) = {Lp}. Thus {p} ~L ~Lp does not hold.
[] Note that in the propositional case Marek's [27] operator E, which produces the unique stable expansion of an L free set of premises E, can be characterized using the new consequence relation: E(E) = {05 E Eae ] E ~L 05}. Hence the new consequence relation ~L provides a straightforward and efficient algorithm for deciding whether a formula is contained in the unique stable expansion of an L free set of premises.
A finitary characterization for Moore-style expansions can be provided in terms of sets of sentences constructed from the LX and ~Lx subformulae of the premises satisfying a special fullness condition. A full set serves as the kernel of a stable expansion; it uniquely characterizes the stable expansion. In fact there is a one-to-one correspondence between full sets and expansions. DEFINITION 2.14 ( [35, 36] ). For a set of sentences E, a set A C_ sfL(~) to -~SfL(E) is Z-full iff the following two conditions hold for every L X c sfL(E):
1. E to A ~ae X iff Lx E A. 2. E U A ~ae X iff ~L X E A. THEOREM 2.15 ([36, 38] (1) has two E-full sets A1 = {L-~Lp,-~Lp} and A2 = {-~L-~Lp, Lp}. For example, A1 is E-full as E to A1 ~ae ~Lp and E tO A1 ~=ae P. This implies that E has exactly two Moore-style expansions SE~(AI) and SEz(A2). As E to A1 ~L P, P ~ SEz(A1 
then e is also. 
THEOREM 2.19 ([38]). Let N C/Zae be a set of sentences. For every E-acceptable (L-hierarchic) enumeration e of/2ae, there exists a E-acceptable (L-hierarchic) enumeration e L of {¢ I L ¢ C sfL(~)} such that BeL(N) is the unique E-full set

O t h e r F o r m s o f N o n m o n o t o n i c R e a s o n i n g
Autoepistemic logic based on L-hierarchic expansions provides an interesting unified basis for a wide range of forms on nonmonotonic reasoning. Leading forrealizations such as default logic, circumscription, logic programs, justificationbased truth maintenance systems, and forms of abduction can be embedded into this variant of autoepistemic logic by using simple local translations and without extra conditions or restriction [39] . Thus, decision problems in these approaches can be reduced to decision problems in autoepistemic logic based on L-hierarchic expansions without introducing additional computational overhead. From the implementational point of view autoepistemic logic based on L-hierarchic expansions offers some advantages over other modal approaches, which are capable of capturing roughly the same range of forms of nonmonotonic reasoning. As this variant of autoepistemic logic is a direct extension of the underlying classical logic, well-developed classical theorem-proving techniques can be used instead of modal theorem-proving methods. L-hierarchic autoepistemic logic is more tightly grounded than, e.g., McDermott and Doyle-style nonmonotonic modal logics. Groundedness requirements restrict the number of l 3 expansions and this might decrease the computational effort needed in the decision procedures. In the next section we show how the tight groundedness of L-hierarchic expansions can be exploited when automating autoepistemic reasoning.
Original autoepistemic logic is closely related to McDermott and Doyle-style nonmonotonic modal logics where for a modal logic 51, the possible sets of nonmonotonic conclusions are defined in terms of 51-expansions. In the original autoepistemic logic as well as in enumeration-based and L-hierarchic autoepistemic logic, nonmonotonic reasoning is formalized by adding direct roles of negative and positive introspection on top the underlying logic, whereas in nonmonotonic modal logics the positive introspection is achieved by adding the necessitation rule and modal axioms. It turns out that in many situations both approaches lead to the same notion of nonmonotonic reasoning and, e.g., decision methods for the other approach are directly applicable to the other approach. As argued above, the approach where modal axioms are avoided appears to be interesting when developing automated reasoning tools because then advanced classical theorem-proving methods can be exploited directly. The following results imply that for a wide range of nonmonotonic modal logics such possibilities exist. 
THEOREM 3.2 ([37]). Let ~ be a finite set of propositional autoepistemic formulae. Then A is an N-expansion (iterative expansion) ofS iff A is an enumerationbased expansion of ~.
Then we consider default logic [43] where possible sets of correct conclusions from a default theory are defined using the notion of extensions of the default theory. Truszczyfiski [50] introduces an appealing translation (2) of default rules into autoepistemic sentences and shows that the consistent expansions of the translated default theory in many McDermott and Doyle-style nonmonotonic modal logics correspond to the extensions of the default theory:
This result holds, e.g., for N-expansions which coincide with enumerationbased expansions. However, the weak groundedness of McDermott and Doylestyle logics causes some problems. [28] , which is the nonmonotonic modal logic N. This is why the correspondence to extensions in default logic holds only for consistent expansions. When using L-hierarchic expansions there is no need to consider only consistent expansions, and we have the following result.
THEOREM 3.3 ([39]). Let (D, W) be a default theory where D is finite. Then a set E C_ £ is an extension of (D, W) iff E = A N £ for an L-hierarchic expansion A of AEDL(D, W).
In the next section we explain how the tight groundedness of L-hierarchic expansions can be exploited so that such weakly grounded expansions not corresponding to extensions in default logic can be eliminated automatically. Default logic is closely related to the answer set semantics [12] of extended logic programs, i.e., logic programs where classical negation (-7) is allowed even in the scope of the negation-as-failure operator (not). Consequently, it is not surprising that answer set semantics can be embedded into autoepistemic logic by using the following mapping:
THEOREM 3.4 ([39]). Let P be a finite extended logic program. Then S is an answer set of P iff S" is the set of literals in an L-hierarchic expansion of LPAE(P).
When considering logic programs where classical negation is not allowed, i.e., general logic programs, the answer set semantics coincides with the stable model semantics [11] .
COROLLARY 3.5. Let P be a finite general logic program. Then S is a stable model of P iff S is the set of atomic sentences in an L-hierarchic expansion of LPAE(P).
Elkan [9] has shown that given a set of justifications J the grounded model of J computed by a justification-based truth maintenance system [6] is just a stable model of J when J is seen as a propositional logic program, i.e., a justification for a node c with in nodes al,. In autoepistemic logic it is possible to capture circumscriptive inference, i.e., the formulae true in every minimal model of a set of premises. We consider the propositional case and a rather general notion of minimal models. A model I (a set of atoms) of ~ is (P, F)-minimal if there is no model I ~ of ~ containing the same fixed atoms from F as I but for which the atoms in P are properly included in the atoms from P in I. This notion of minimal models corresponds to parallel circumscription [24] where the atomic sentences P are minimized and the atomic sentences not in F or P are allowed to vary. For a set of formulae P, we define MIN(P) = {~L¢ -+ ¢ I ¢ c P} and FIX(P) = MIN(P) U MIN(~P) where c~ denotes the complement of a formula ¢.
THEOREM 3.7 ([39]). Let P and F be finite sets of atomic sentences and ~ C F_.. For every sentence ¢ E £. holds that ¢ is true in every (P, F)-minimal model of ~ iff ¢ belongs to every L-hierarchic expansion of ~ U MIN(P) U FIX(F).
Konolige [23] shows how to achieve minimalization in the first-order case with nonfinite domains by using a variant of the original autoepistemic logic that allows quantification into the scope of L operators. He uses the same scheme as above to minimize and fix predicates.
Automating Nonmonotonic Reasoning
In the general setting autoepistemic reasoning is decidable if the underlying consequence relation ~ae is decidable [38] . Moreover, decision procedures can be obtained from the finitary characterization based on full sets in a very straightforward fashion. For brave reasoning an expansion containing a given formula must be found and for cautious reasoning it must be verified that a given formula is in all the expansions. This can be achieved by constructing the characterizing full set for each of the expansions and performing the membership test on the basis of the full set as implied by Theorem 2.15 using the consequence relation ~I~ (see [38] for details). However, a decision procedure that is based directly on the finitary characterization is not very practical because in order to construct the full sets using a direct approach, it is necessary to iterate over every subset of the set of LX subformulae of the premises. If the cardinality of a set is n, it has 2 n subsets. Even for n = 10 this means 1024 iterations each of which might be computationally costly, i.e., involve a number of calls to a theorem prover for the underlying consequence relation ~ae.
Decision problems in leading approaches to nonmonotonic reasoning such as default logic, autoepistemic logic, nonmonotonic modal logics, and circumscription are complete problems with respect to the second level of the polynomial time hierarchy in the propositional case [14, 49, 38, 8] . For example, brave derivability with respect to L-hierarchic expansions is E~-complete and cautious derivability is II~-complete [38] . Hence propositional nonmonotonic reasoning is strictly harder than classical propositional reasoning unless the polynomial time hierarchy collapses which is considered unlikely by the experts [17] . Consequently, any general decision method for autoepistemic reasoning most likely has an exponential worst-case time complexity. However, a practically oriented decision method should be able to take advantage of possible regularities in a given set of premises. For example, consider a set of premises
A straightforward approach would examine the 2 n subsets of {Lpo,..., Lpn-1} to find the unique ~-full set A = {Lpo,... ,Lp,~-I}. However, by carefully exploiting the monotonicity of the underlying consequence relation ~ae, it is possible to find the full set without iterating over the subsets: for any E-full set A, E U A ~ae P0 holds, and thus Lpo E A must hold, which in turn implies Lpl E A and so on. The novel decision method aims to take full advantage of the monotonicity of ~ae.
We develop first a decision method for autoepistemic reasoning based on L-hierarchic expansions. The decision method constructs E-full sets for L-hierarchic expansions of E. The E-full sets can be found by examining the enumerations of the set {6 [ L~ C Sft'(E)}. However, the enumerations are not important but the sets of beliefs induced by the enumerations. This observation cuts the combinatorial explosion considerably as typically there is a large number of enumerations inducing the same E-full set. The full sets are developed together as far as possible so that the same computation is not repeated by exploiting the monotonicity of the underlying consequence relation ~ae. The novel decision method for autoepistemic reasoning needs only a theorem prover for the underlying monotonic consequence relation ~ae as a subroutine.
The approach differs from techniques where nonmonotonic reasoning is reduced to another problem such as a truth maintenance problem [18, 19] , a theorem proving problem [31] , or a constraint satisfaction problem [2, 3] . These reductions provide valuable insights to the relationships between the corresponding problems and enable new techniques to be used for solving nonmonotonic reasoning problems. However, while there are interesting subclasses of nonmonotonic reasoning problems where the problem size increases only polynomially as a result of the reduction mapping (see, e.g., [19, 31, 2] ), in the general case the reductions can lead to an exponential increase in the problem size. Hence in these reduction approaches the worst case space complexity becomes exponential. Moreover, the reductions are computationally complex even for restricted classes of nonmonotonic reasoning problems. The use of a normal form and the need to encode classical proofs can be seen as factors leading to the increase in the problem size and the high (time) complexity of the reductions. Note that because decision problems in nonmonotonic reasoning are complete problems with respect to the second level of the polynomial time hierarchy in the propositional case, there cannot exist a polynomial time reduction from propositional nonmonotonic reasoning to an NP-complete (or eo-NP-complete) problem unless the polynomial time hierarchy collapses.
As an example we consider the approach of Junker and Konolige [18, 19] . In this approach the premises are required to be in a normal form with no nested L operators. In the worst case, if a set of premises is transformed into the normal form, its size might increase exponentially. Then the premises are mapped to a set of justifications in a truth maintenance system. The size of the resulting set of justifications can be exponential with respect to the size of the premises and the mapping is computationaUy complex. This is because the set of justifications corresponding to premises ~ includes all monotonic justifications where Lq~ C SfL(~) and {~l,..-, ~n) is a minimal proof of q~ from H = {w ] ~Lo~ V L/31 V -.. V L/3m V ~ E ~ -/2), i.e., a minimal subset of H such that (~ n/2) U {~1,... ,~n} ~d q~ holds. For an Lq~ subformula of the premises, ~b can possess an exponential number of minimal proofs. In addition, it seems that it is computationally quite hard to find every such minimal subset even if the logical consequence test (i.e., whether (~ N £) U {~Ol,..., wn} ~d 0 holds) is computationally very inexpensive. The problem of finding a proof of 0 from a hypothesis set H given a background theory ~ (i.e., finding a set of H ~ C H such that ~ U H ~ ~cl q~) is closely related to logic-based abduction [41, 45, 7] , where usually the proof H ~ is required to be consistent with the background theory ~. If the background theory is a set of clauses, then deciding whether there is a consistent proof of an atom from a set of atoms is ~-complete in the propositional case [7] , which implies that the decision problem is strictly harder than propositional reasoning unless the polynomial time hierarchy collapses. As propositional brave autoepistemic reasoning is also ~-complete [38] , the search problem of finding a consistent proof of an atom is at least as hard as brave autoepistemic reasoning.
Consistent proofs are computationally hard to find already in very restricted cases. For example, if the background theory is a set of propositional Horn clauses and the hypothesis set H is a set of atomic formulae, it is NP-complete to decide whether there is a consistent proof of an atom from H [45, 7] . Note that the corresponding reasoning problem (i.e., whether an atom is a logical consequence of a set of Horn clauses) is solvable in linear time [5] .
It is still harder to find all minimal proofs. It can be the case that it is easy to check whether a proof exists but all minimal proofs are hard to find. For instance, it can be shown that the problem of deciding whether there is a proof of size K or less is NP-complete when the background theory is empty, the hypothesis set contains only conjunctions of atoms and the goal is a conjunction of atoms. This can be proved by showing that the minimum cover problem, which is NP-complete [10] , can be reduced to this minimum proof problem. In the minimum cover problem a collection C of subsets of a set S and a positive integer K are given, and it is required to determine whether there is a subset of C with K or less elements such that the union of the elements equals S. It is straightforward to show that such a subset of C exists iff there is a proof of Sf of size K or less from CI where Sf is a conjunction of the elements of S and CI is the set consisting of a conjunction of elements for each set in the collection C.
In Junker and Konolige's approach an expansion corresponds to a suitable model of the justifications. For example, strongly grounded expansions correspond to grounded models, but deciding whether there is a grounded model is NP-complete [9] . The exponential worst-case space complexity and the high time complexity of the reductions, even for quite restricted classes of nonmonotonic reasoning problems, raise questions about the usability of the reduction approaches as general decision methods for nonmonotonic reasoning. Figure 1 presents the function derLE, which is the key part of the novel decision method. The function derLE is a skeleton for the decision procedures for brave and cautious reasoning as well as for checking the existence of expansions. For that purpose it contains an unspecified function test. By changing this function the various decision procedures are obtained. The function derLE takes as input a set of premise E, sets/3 and F, which give the common part of the Y;-full sets to be considered; and a sentence ¢, which is just passed as an argument to the function test.
A NOVEL DECISION METHOD FOR AUTOEPISTEMIC REASONING
The purpose of derLE is to return true iff there exists and L-hierarchic expansion A of E containing BUF such that test (N, A, ¢) retums true, where A is the E-full set corresponding A, i.e., A = SEz (A). This is achieved by constructing N-full sets which contain/3 U F and correspond to L-hierarchic expansions until a full set A is found for which test (E, A, ¢) returns true.
In the correctness proof of derLE we use the following two notions. An enumeration e is fully L-hierarchic if for every formula ¢ in e for each subformula LX of ¢, X appears before ¢ in e. The set B is generated by some enumeration e if B = Be(E). A skeleton for the decision procedures for autoepistemic reasoning based on L-hierarchic expansions.
In the decision method the idea is to expand the set B so that finally it contains every formula in a full set. By Theorem 2.19 for every L-hierarchic expansion, the corresponding full set is generated by some fully L-hierarchic enumeration from N. This implies that when deciding how to extend B the number of possibilities can be reduced by considering only those extensions that are generated by some fully L-hierarchic enumeration from N. Hence in the decision method B is extended only if the resulting set B ~ is generated by some fully L-hierarchic enumeration em of a subset of {~ [ Lq~ E sfL(~)} from E, i.e., B ~ = Bern m (~). The set F contains L X sentences that should be included in the full set to be constructed but are "frozen": a sentence L X E F is added to B only after N U B ~ae X holds and B covers all LX 1 subformulae of X, i.e., In derLE the results of positive introspection are first propagated as far as possible by using the function pOSLE presented in Figure 2 . The function exploits the monotonicity of the underlying consequence relation ~ae and expands the sets B and F; that is, if B is included in a full a set and ~ U B ~ae ¢, then L¢ belongs to the full set. It is straightforward to verify that pOSLE has the following properties. If there is some L X E sfL(N) not covered by B U F, LX or ~L X should be included in the full set. In order to ensure that B extended by -~Lx is generated by some fully L-hierarchic enumeration, only LX formulae for which sfL(x) C q-atom(B) are considered. Then we known that if B is generated by a fully L-hierarchic enumeration e, then B U {~Lx} is generated by a fully L-hierarchic enumeration, i.e., e extended by X. This is because N U B ~=ae X holds, since otherwise LX would have been added to B in the function posL~.
There are two possibilities for such a formula LX: either -~Lx is in the full set, or LX is in the full set. The two alternatives are handled by backtracking. Proof. We prove the lemma by induction on the cardinality of the set
SL(N,B,F) = SfC(N) -(q-atom(B) U F).
Let q-atom(B) U F c_ SfL(N), let there exist a fully L-hierarchic enumeration generating B from N, and let dernE(N, B, F, 05) return true. The function derLE starts by introspection. Using Proposition 2.17 and Proposition 4.1 (I1, I2), we can establish the following basic result, which shows that if SfL(Y;) C_ q-atom(B) tO F after introspection, an acceptable enumeration exists.
(B) If SL(P,, B', F') = 0 holds where (B', F') = pOSLE(P,, B, F), then there exists an L-hierarchic N-acceptable enumeration gn of the set {X I LX E sfL(P,)} such that B tO F c_ B~,~(P,) and test (N, B~n(P,), 05) returns true. This can be shown in the following way. Let SL(P,,B',F') = 0. Then sfL(P,) C q-atom(B') to F'. As derLE(N, B, F, 05) returns true, F' C_ B' and for all -~Lx E B', P~ tO B' ~=ae X and, furthermore, test(P,,B',05) returns true. As B is generated by a fully L-hierarchic enumeration, by Proposition 4.1 (I2) there is a fully L-hierarchic enumeration e,~ generating B', i.e. B' = B~ ~ (P,). We show first that en is a N-acceptable enumeration of {X ] LX E SfL(N)}. By Proposition 4.1 (I1) q-atom(B')tO F' C_ sfL(P,). As F' C B', q-atom(B') U F' = q-atom(B'). Thus q-atom(B') = SfC(N). This implies that en is an enumeration of {X [ LX E sfL(N)}. As for all -~L X E Be~'~(P,), P, tO Ben's(N) ~=ae X, by Proposition 2. [] The next lemma shows that the function derLE is complete, i.e., if there is a full set for which the function test succeeds, then derLE returns true. derLE(N, B, F, ~) returns true.
LEMMA 4.5. Let ~ be a finite set of sentences. Let En be an L-hierarchic Y;-acceptable enumeration of {X I LX C sfL(~)} such that test(N,B~n(2), qS) returns true. Then for every set B of sentences and F of Lx sentences such that
Proof We prove the lemma by induction on the cardinality of SL(N, B, F) = sfL(N) -(q-atom(B) tO F). Let there exist an L-hierarchic E-acceptable enumeration en of {X I LX E sfL(N)} such that test(E, B~'~(N), ¢) returns true. Let B be a set of sentences, and let F be a set of L X sentences such that B tO F c_ B~ ,~ (Z).
Using Proposition 4.1 03, I4) and Proposition 2.17, we can establish a result showing that if SL(E, B, F) = 0 after introspection, the function derLE returns true.
(B) Let (B', F') = pOSLE(E, B, F). If SL(E, B', F') = 0, then derLE(E, B, F, ¢) returns true. This can be shown in the following way. By Proposition 4.1 (I3) B' U F' C_ B~ n (E) holds. Let SL(E, B', F ~) = 0. Then it is straightforward to establish that
holds. Using this, we show that
holds. Assume that there is some LX E U -B ~. By (6) X is some ~bi in en. Let ~bi be a sentence with the smallest index (in en) such that L¢i C F ~ but L¢i ~ B'. By (6) L¢i E B~ n (E) and thus ~L¢i ~ B~'~(E). Then by (6) ~L¢i ~ B'. Thus L¢i E sfL(E) --q-atom(B'). As L~bi C B~n(E), E tO B~21 (E) ~ae ~)i holds.
~r~ BI
We show next that Bi_I(E ) C_ holds. If L~bj E B~21(E), then j < i and by (6) L~bj E B' tO F'. As j < i, LCj E B'. If -~LCj C B~21(E), then by (6) ~LCj C B' t3 F' and thus ~L~j C B'. So B~_~I (E) Q B' and thus
E tO B ! ~ae ~/)i holds by the monotonicity of ~ae. But as en is L-hierarchic, _ c,, E _ q-atom(B'). Because L~bi E sfL(~), PropoSfL(~bi) C q-atom(Bi_l()) c sition 4.1 (I4) implies L~bi E q-atom(B~), a contradiction. Thus (7) holds. By (6) and (7) Assume that SL(E,B',F') ¢ (0. First we show that there exists a sentence L X E SL(E,B',F') such that SfL(x) C q-atom(B'). Consider a sentence ~bi which is the sentence with the smallest index (in a,~) such that L~bi E SL(E,B',F'). We show that sfL(~bi) C_ q-atom(B'). Let L~bj E SfL(~bi). As an is L-hierarchic, j < i. Therefore L~bj E q-atom(B') U F / by the minimality requirement for i. It sufficient to show that L~bj E F 1 implies L~bj E q-atom(B ~) because this implies L~bj E q-atom(B') and thus sfL(~bi) C q-atom(B'). Let L~bj E F t. By Proposition 4.1 (I3) L~bj E B~n(E) and N U B~_I(N) ~ae @j holds. Using Proposition 4.1 (I3, I4), we can prove that 
(E, B, F, O) returns true iff there exists an L-hierarchic E-acceptable enumeration an of the set {X ] LX E sfL(E)} such that B U F C Ben ,~ (E) and test(E, Ben n (N), ~b) returns true.
The theorem implies that if the underlying consequence relation ~ae is decidable, decision procedures for ~c(LE), ~b(LE), and the L-hierarchic expansion existence problem can be obtained by employing an appropriate function test and taking the empty set as the initial common part of the full sets. These test functions are straightforward to devise because membership in an expansion is captured by the consequence relation ~L, i.e., given a B-full set A, 05 is in the corresponding unique expansion iff ~ U A ~L 05 (Theorem 2.15 (2) by Theorems 2.18 and 2.19, it can be shown that derLE(E,0, O,05) returns true iff there is an L-hierarchic expansion of E not containing 05.
•
The completeness results with respect to the second level of the polynomial time hierarchy [14, 38, 49] imply that there are two independent sources of complexity in nonmonotonic reasoning: -required monotonic reasoning and -conflict resolution.
In the decision method the two sources are clearly identifiable. In the autoepistemic framework required monotonic reasoning is given by the underlying consequence relation ~ae, and in the decision method this task can be handled by a separate theorem prover. The conflict resolution task emerges when deciding which formula is included in the full set from the available L X subformulae of the premises. In the decision method the conflict resolution task is solved by a simple backtracking scheme. If there is a conflict for some -~Lx ~ included in the full to be constructed, the method backtracks to the last choice point where some ~Lx was added and retracts this choice. The other alternative is explored by putting LX as a "frozen" belief to be included in the full set later. The same backtracking mechanism can be exploited when searching for an expansion containing a given sentence (brave derivability) or an expansion not containing a given sentence (cautious derivability). When a full set has been found, the function test is invoked to determine whether the expansion induced by the full set satisfies the required condition, e.g. contains a given sentence. If this is not the case (i.e., test returns false), the method backtracks to the last choice point and tries the other alternative. In the decision method a conflict test is performed immediately after positive introspection has been completed. The aim is to cut the backtracking as early as possible when a conflict emerges.
The decision procedures for ~c(E), ~'~b(E), and the enumeration-based expansion existence problem can be obtained easily by modifying the functions pOSLE and derLE slightly. The only change is that there is no need to require that sfL(x) C_ q-atom(B) for the new (-~)Lx formulae to be added to B. A skeleton of the resulting decision procedures is given in Figure 3 .
The decision procedures for ~c, ~b, and the Moore-style expansion existence problem can be devised by using the function derE but further modifying the function pOSE. Now the frozen beliefs can be used in positive introspection because the groundedness requirement for Moore-style expansions is not a strict as for enumeration-based expansions. The modified function posM is given in Figure 4 .
Notice that computationally Moore-style stable expansions and enumerationbased expansions (N-expansions) are very similar. In the decision method the only difference is that for Moore-style expansions also the frozen beliefs F can be used in positive introspection but for enumeration-based expansions they cannot be employed. The key difference between these classes of expansions and L-hierarchic expansions is that L-hierarchic expansions are more tightly grounded in the premises. Groundedness requirements reduce the number of expansions, which suggests that computational advantages can be acquired by considering a tightly grounded class of expansions. For L-hierarchic expansions such computational advantages can be obtained: the tight groundedness of L-hierarchic expansions is exploited in the decision method to cut the search space for conflict resolution. When choosing the next formula to be included in the full set, for L-hierarchic expansions it is sufficient to consider only those free LX subformulae of premises whose L~ subformulae are already covered by B, whereas for Moore-style expansions and enumeration-based expansions, all free LX subformulae of premises have to be considered. This means that when the premises contain nested L operators, the search space for conflict resolution can be considerably larger for Moore-style and enumeration-based expansions than for L-hierarchic expansions. Next we consider the computational complexity of the decision method. First we note that the space complexity of the method is determined by the space complexity of the theorem prover implementing the consequence tests. If the theorem prover has a polynomial space bound, then the decision method has polynomial space complexity. This implies that the decision method yields a polynomial space decision procedure, e.g., for propositional autoepistemic reasoning because propositional consequence tests can be performed within a polynomial space bound.
The number of calls to the theorem prover for the underlying consequence relation ~ae provides a reasonable estimate of the worst case computational complexity of the decision method. We denote by tpcalls(~, B, F, ¢) the number of calls to the theorem prover for ~ae in the decision method when the input to the method is ~, B, F, ¢. We show that if ~ is an upper bound for the number of calls to the underlying theorem prover in the function test, then tpcalls(~, B, F, ¢) ~< (2 ~+1 -1)S 2 + 2~t,
where S is the cardinality of the set SfL(N) and u is the cardinality of the set SfL(~) --(q-atom(B) tO F). This can be shown by induction on u. If u = 0, then sfL(N) _C q-atom(B) tO F and calls to the underlying theorem prover are made only during positive introspection, conflict testing and in the function test. Hence (10) holds. As a consequence of (10), an upper bound for the number of calls to the underlying theorem prover when deciding whether a set of premise ~ has an expansion is
where S is the number of LX subformulae of G. For brave and cautious derivability the function test decides ~L, and this can be implemented by using at most p 4-1 calls to the underlying theorem prover, where p is the number of L X subformuale of 4). Hence an upper bound for number of calls to the underlying theorem prover when deciding whether 4) is derivable (in the brave or cautious sense) from G is
where S is the number of Ly subformulae of N and p is the number of L;~ subformulae of 4).
In the new method the theorem prover is used extensively to propagate positive introspection. It is interesting to compare the novel decision method with a straight-forward approach to finding full sets where the theorem prover is not used to prune the search space. For example, full sets corresponding to L-hierarchic expansions can be found by simply iterating over every subset A + of the L4) subformulae of the premises N and performing a groundedness test for each A +, i.e., testing whether A + U {-,L X I LX E SfL(2) -A +} corresponds to a E-full set generated by an L-hierarchic enumeration. In this approach an upper bound for the number of calls to a theorem prover for ~ae is 2£'S 2, where S is the number of L~p subformulae of ~. This is because there are 2 s subsets A + and an upper bound for the number of theorem prover calls in the groundedness test is S 2. Hence in the worst case the novel decision method uses only two times as many theorem prover calls as the straightforward approach. It seems beneficial to attempt to propagate positive introspection because the extra calls to the theorem prover are advantageous when successful: every time when it is discovered that a formula X is a consequence of the premises and the set B and a new formula L X is added to /3 or F in the function pOSLE, the upper bound for the number of theorem prover calls in the remaining computation is cut by half. In the same way, the extra calls to implement a conflict test during every recursive call of the decision method can lead to significant gains if a conflict is detected: an exponential number of calls to the theorem prover can be saved.
A similar straightforward approach can be used to find full sets corresponding to enumeration-based and Moore-style expansions. For enumeration-based expansions an upper bound for the number of calls to the theorem prover in the straightforward approach is also 2SS 2, but for Moore-style expansions it is 2SS because the groundedness test is just a fullness test, which can be implemented with at most S calls to the theorem prover.
Finally, note that the mappings from other forms of nonmonotonic reasoning presented in Section 3 into autoepistemic logic are simple local linear mappings. Hence when using the novel method to implement decision procedures for these forms of nonmonotonic reasoning, the mappings do not introduce any significant source of complexity or increase in the problem size.
The decision method described above is completely general. It does not rely on any additional assumptions about the underlying logic which determines the consequence relation ~ae. For example, no normal form transformation of the premises is required. The method needs a theorem prover for ~ae as a subroutine, but no extra requirements are posed on the theorem prover. Properties of the underlying logic as well as possible regularities of the sets of premises can be utilized to optimize the computationally costly subtasks in the decision method: required monotonic reasoning and conflict resolution. The theorem prover for ~ae can exploit any special properties of the underlying logic or restricted form of the premises to achieve highest possible performance. For example, the order of solving the subgoals during theorem proving is not restricted. If the set of premises is of some special form for which a special-purpose theorem prover is available, this theorem prover can be applied immediately. It should be noted that in spite of formulae containing L operators, the theorem prover for ~ae is very similar to that for the underlying logic CL. This is because the LX sentences behave like atomic sentences in the propositional calculus as far as the consequence relation ~ae goes. For example, if the underlying logic is a first-order predicate calculus, we can use as a theorem prover for ~ae a theorem prover for the predicate calculus that treats LX sentence as new nilary predicates. An interesting topic of further research is to study possibilities of exploiting the regular pattern in which the theorem prover for ~ae is used and make use of previous computations when deciding ~ae.
Optimization of conflict resolution is also a challenging area of further research. An interesting approach is to investigate the notion of safe disbeliefs. The idea is to identify disbeliefs ~Lx such that X does not follow from E and any possible extension of B U {-~Lx} U F. This reduces backtracking because then B can be extended safely by ~Lx, since for ~Lx a conflict is not possible.
The two independent sources of complexity nicely explain the high computational complexity of seemingly very simple subclasses of default logic and autoepistemic logic [21, 48, 30, 31 ] . In order to obtain a subclass of nonmonotonic reasoning with favorable computational properties, it is not enough to restrict the form of formulae to make the classical reasoning task easy; the conflict resolution task also has to be addressed. Niemel~i and Rintanen [40] have studied the notion of stratification originally introduced in the context of logic programs and have shown that when considering only stratified sets of autoepistemic formulae [30] , the conflict resolution task can be solved efficiently and a general iterative decision method can be devised. The iterative decision method can be used also for stratified default logic, logic programs, truth maintenance systems, and McDermott and Doyle-style nonmonotonic modal logics. For example, a linear time decision procedure for stratified propositional logic programs and truth maintenance systems is obtained [40] .
A DECISION METHOD FOR DEFAULT LOGIC
As an example of developing optimization techniques we derive a new complete decision method for Reiter's default logic. By Theorem 3.3 default logic can be seen as a special case of autoepistemic logic based on L-hierarchic expansions. The simple logical character of the LX sentences can be exploited when deciding ~ae, and the set of premises can be reduced considerably when the premises are restricted to the form resulting from the translation (2). An interesting notion of safe disbeliefs can be developed for the subclass of autoepistemic sentences resulting from the translation (2). The idea is to strengthen the premises E by "assuming" ~L~b for every L~ ~ BUF in addition to those -~Lg5 already in B. It turns out that a disbelief -~L~b is safe if ~b does not follow from the strengthened premises P~* and B using positive introspection. The function safenegLE in Figure 5 computes these safe disbeliefs given the premises and the sets B and F. It is easy to exploit safe disbeliefs in the decision method. Instead of propagating positive introspection by using pOSLE, both positive and safe negative introspection are propagated. This means that the function intr%E in Figure 5 is used instead of pOSLE in the beginning of derLE. Notice that introLE also computes safe disbeliefs that are based on the fact that ~L~L~b belongs to every consistent L-hierarchic expansion containing L~b. We call the resulting function derDL. EXAMPLE 4.9. Consider the propositional case, the premises E = {L--,Lp ---+ q, L~Lq ---+ p} and the execution of derLe(E, (3, (3, qS returns.
• Theorem 3.3 implies that, in order to establish that the function derDL is a sound and complete decision method for brave and cautious derivability in default logic as well as for the extension existence problem, it is sufficient to show that Theorem 4.6 holds for derDL when given premises of the form resulting from the translation (2). Proof. This is Theorem 4.6 except that the form of the premises is restricted and the function introL~ is employed instead of just pOSLE in derDL. In order to prove Theorem 4.6, it was sufficient that pOSLE satisfied the four conditions in Proposition 4.1. Hence, in order to prove Theorem 4.10, it is sufficient to show that introLE satisfies the same four conditions (I1-I4):
Let (B',F') = introLE(E, B, F).
(I1) B c B' and F C F ', and if q-atom(B) U F C sfL(E), then q-atom(B ~) tO F' c_ SfL(E).
(I2) If there is some fully L-hierarchic enumeration generating B from E, then there is a fully L-hierarchic enumeration generating B' from E.
(I3) If B tO F C_ Be~ n (E) for some E-acceptable L-hierarchic enumeration an of {X [ LX E sfL(E)}, then B' tO F' C Ben"(E).
(I4) For all LX E sfL(E), if sfL(x) C_ q-atom(B') and E U B' Dae X, then LX C q-atom(B').
We prove that each condition is satisfied by showing for every step in the body of the repeat loop in introi.E that if the condition holds before the step, then it holds after the step. By Proposition 4.1 the conditions hold for p0sI.E, and it remains to show that the conditions are satisfied by the two other steps where/3 is extended.
(I1) This clearly holds for introLE.
(I2) Let B be generated by a fully L-hierarchic enumeration c,~ = ~Pl,..-, ~P~ from P,.
(safenegLE) Let Bsn = safenegLE(~, B, F). We establish that there exists a fully L-hierarchic enumeration generating B U Bsn from ~. We show that for all ~L~p E Bsn,
Now B U Bsn is generated by an enumeration ~,~,, which is obtained by extending e,~ with formulae {~ [ -~L~ E Bsn} in any order. This is because Efr~ / it can be shown that for every i,m < i ~< rn I, B~_~(~) C_/3 U/3sn, which by (1 1) implies E U Bi_ 1 (~) ~ae ~Pi, and thus -~L~p~ E B e'~' m, (z). So it remains to show that (1 1) holds. In the proof we use the following result, which is straightforward to establish. B~I (E), which implies that E U B~I(E ) is inconsistent, a contradiction. (II) If-,Lbt is not ~j, then L~Lbt E Bj_I(E ). As consistent and B~ ~_ 1 (E) is generated by a fully L-hierarchic enumeration ~1,.. •, Cj-1 from E, by (NegBels) implies ~Lbt E B~_I(E) C B~ '~(E). Thus in either case (I) and (II) Lbt ~ B t3 F C B~ n (E). Hence La --~ c E E*. As La E B~" (E), by the inductive hypothesis E* U/3* ~ae a. By Proposition 4.1 (I4) La C q-atom(/3*). Assume -~La E B*. Then ~La E B because/3* is an extension/3 where only formulae of the form L X have been added. But then as/3 U F C B~,~ (E), -,La E BEn ~ (E). This is a contradiction because La E B~'~(E) implies ~La ~ B~'~(E). Hence ~La ~/3*and La E 13". Thus c E Hds(E*,/3*) and (16) holds. Hence we have shown that (15) holds. Using (15), we can easily establish (14) . Let ~L¢ E B~n. Then E*UB* ~ae holds, L¢ 6 sfL(E) and ~b E/2. Hence ~ is some ~i in the enumeration e~. By (15) L,~i ~ B~'~(E), which implies ~L~i E B?(E). Hence (14) holds. The resulting decision method does not use the obvious idea of building an extension of a default theory by trying to find a suitable order of applying the default rules. Instead, it constructs the set of applicable rules by cautiously building a set representing the valid premises of the rules, i.e., the set /3. Autoepistemic logic offers a convenient language for this as it easy to represent the fact that a prerequisite a of a rule holds (La) and that it holds that a justification b is consistent (L~L--,b) . Every time a backtracking choice is made, an approximation of the intersection of the possible extensions is constructed using safe disbeliefs and propagation of positive introspection in a way that is closely related to stationary default extensions [42] . This can reduce the number of choice points in backtracking considerably. However, here we have integrated the approximation method efficiently in the backtracking search: not only is the partially constructed set of valid premises (/3) used but also the information from the backtracking search (i.e., the frozen beliefs F) is employed when constructing the next approximation.
The embedding (4) of logic programs and truth maintenance systems into autoepistemic logic is very similar to that of default logic. Consequently, Theo-rem 3.4 and Corollaries 3.5, 3.6 imply that derDL can be use a basis for implementing answer set and stable model semantics of logic programs as well as justification-based truth maintenance systems.
Next we consider the computational complexity of safe negative introspection in terms of the number of calls to the theorem prover for the underlying consequence relation. If the input for the function safenegnE is E, B, F, then an upper bound for the number of calls is p2 -F f, where p is the number of L~ formulae which occur as prerequisites in 2 (i.e., there is a formula (L~ A L~Lbl A ... A L~Lbn) ~ c 6 N), but for which L~ ~ q-atom(B) and f is the number of L~ subformulae of E for which ~ E/2 and L~ ~ q-atom(B). Hence the number of theorem-proving calls to compute safe negative introspection is at most quadratic with respect to the number of L~ subformulae of E. This implies that the number of theorem proving calls to compute the function introcE is at most cubic with respect to the number of L~b subformulae of 2. Recall that for positive introspection there is a quadratic upper bound for the number of theorem prover calls. However, it appears that the extra calls needed to compute safe negative introspection can be very beneficial: every new safe disbelief cuts the upper bound for the number of theorem prover calls in the remaining computation by half.
We finish this section by comparing the novel decision method for default logic with other approaches. Junker and Konolige's method of reducing nonmonotonic reasoning to a truth maintenance problem is applicable also for default logic [18] . As discussed in the beginning of this section, this approach does not seem very promising in the full propositional case because the reduction mapping is computationally at least as hard as the decision problems in default logic and the reduction mapping leads to an exponential increase in the problem size and thus to exponential worst-case space complexity. Schwind and Risch [44] propose a tableau-based method. Also, this approach suffers from the problem of exponential worst-case space complexity, while the method proposed here can be implemented in polynomial space for full propositional default logic.
Baader and Hollunder [1] propose an approach to generate all extensions of a default theory by pruning defaults in a top-down way. Given a default theory (D, W), their method first considers all maximal subsets D ~ of default rules D such that W U Conseq(D') is consistent, where Conseq(D') are the consequents of the defaults D ~, and then eliminates defaults from these sets until a generating set of defaults for an extension is found. There are problems related to these maximal sets. First, there can be an exponential number of these maximal subsets, but the subsets might play no role in finding extensions. A pathological example of this is the default theory 
P~ ~Pl Pn ~Pn ~b
There is an exponential number of maximal subsets D ~ of D such that W U Conseq(D ~) is consistent, and the method of Baader and Hollunder considers them all. Our method is a bottom-up approach, and it finds the unique extension without any backtracking. Second, when eliminating defaults, the method of Baader and Hollunder uses heavily a subroutine computing all maximal consistent subsets. That is, given sets N and H, the subroutine is expected to find all maximal subsets H r of H such that N U H ~ is consistent. It seems that finding all such maximal sets is computationally quite expensive and at least as hard as the decision problems in default logic. This is because, for example, finding a maximal subset not containing a given formula in H is closely related to logicbased abduction. To see this, consider a maximal subset H ~ C_ H such that NUH ~ is consistent but for which ~ E H-H ~. Because H ~ is maximal, 2UH~U {~} is not consistent, which implies ~ U H ~ ~cl -~, i.e., H ~ is an abductive explanation of 7@ from hypotheses H and background theory ~. Logic-based abduction is N[-complete [7] as is brave reasoning in default logic [14] . Hence the method of Baader and Hollunder is based on a subroutine that appears to be computationally harder than propositional reasoning, whereas our method needs as a subroutine only a theorem prover for the underlying logic.
Conclusions
We have developed a novel decision method for autoepistemic reasoning that is applicable in a general setting, i.e., for an autoepistemic logic defined on top of a given classical logic. The aim has been to devise a conceptually simple method in which sources of complexity are clearly identifiable and which offers a robust framework for developing further optimization techniques. Two orthogonal sources can be identified: classical reasoning and conflict resolution. The classical reasoning task can be handled using a separate theorem prover. The decision method imposes no additional requirements leaving abundant room for optimizations of the theorem prover. The conflict resolution task is solved by employing a simple backtracking scheme. The method exploits efficiently the monotonicity of the underlying consequence relation to reduce choice points in backtracking. An interesting topic of further research is to study more advanced backtracking schemes to enhance, e.g., goal-directedness. The method provides a direct decision procedure for tightly grounded autoepistemic reasoning based on L-hierarchic expansions, and no additional groundedness tests are needed. Decision methods for more weakly grounded forms of autoepistemic reasoning based on Moore-style expansions and N-expansions are obtained by minor adjustments. The method can be implemented to run in polynomial space in the propositional case. Leading forms of nonmonotonic reasoning, such as default logic and circumscription, can be embedded into autoepistemic logic based on L-hierarchic expansions using simple local translations. Thus the method can be used as a unified approach to automating a large range of forms of nonmonotonic reasoning. As an example of the optimization possibilities we develop a new complete decision method for default logic where the search space for applicable default roles is pruned efficiently by using ideas from autoepistemic reasoning. An interesting topic of further research is to investigate the applicability of the method for implementing truth maintenance systems as well as stable model semantics and answer set semantics of logic programs.
